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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err in admitting evidence obtained

in violation of state and federal constitutional provisions?
2.

Did the Court of Appeals err in upholding the trial

court's ruling?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendants were charged with several criminal counts of
commercial bribery, antitrust boycott and racketeering.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 26, 1983, Judge Boyd Bunnell of the 7th District
authorized the Attorney General's office to conduct a criminal
investigation pursuant to the Subpoena Powers Act.

Based almost

entirely on evidence discovered during the course of the
investigation, criminal charges were filed against Appellants and
other co-Defendants in 3rd District.
1985.

Appellants were tried in

Prior to trial the Appellants were granted a severance

from the trial of co-defendant L. Brent Fletcher.

Appellants

moved to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to the secret
investigation conducted by the Attorney General.
denied.

The motion was

The Appellants were found guilty on counts charging

bribery, anti-trust and racketeering violations.

Appellant

Michael Thompson was sentenced to serve not less than one nor
more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.

Appellant

Bruce Conklin was sentenced to serve one year in the Salt Lake

County Jail on work release.
antitrust violations.

Each was fined $25,000 for the

Based on the racketeering convictions the

Court also ordered forfeiture of all business interests of Appellants in their security guard companies.
During trial, Appellants moved for mistrial on the basis
that the prosecution had improperly elicited from two witnesses
the fact that co-defendant Fletcher had previously been tried on
the same charges and on the further basis that a juror had
discovered the fact that Fletcher was convicted.
were denied.

These motions

Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal on September

13, 1985. (R.439)
Petitioners1 sentences were stayed pending appeal.
The appeal was originally

(R.478)

filed in this Court but was

subsequently transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals and heard
there.

Two members of the Utah Court of Appeals panel voted to

affirm the convictions.

Judge Gregory K. Orme dissented as to

the group boycott antitrust convictions.
P.2d 805 (Utah App. 1988) 1

Appellants Thompson and Conklin

petitioned the Court for a Rehearing.
April 8, 1988.

State v. Thompson, 751

The Petition was denied

Appellants filed a petition for certiorari which

was granted July 7, 1988.

This case was inadvertently given the heading State v.
Fletcher in the Pacific Reporter advance sheets. The trial of
Mr. Fletcher was severed from that of Appellants. Each appealed
separately.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Pursuant to the Utah Subpoena Powers Act, Utah Code Ann. §§
77-22-1 through 77-22-3, the Attorney General instigated a secret
investigation centered on alleged misconduct in the handling of
Utah Power & Light's security contracts.

Subpoenas were issued

by the Attorney General's office without prior judicial review or
approval. In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 638 (Utah
1988)2 The subpoenas stated that they were authorized by Order
of the District Court and that disobedience was punishable by
contempt.

(See Appendix, Page 1)

None of the subpoenas

described the nature or scope of the investigation, nor were the
recipients informed as to the general subject matter of the
investigation.

In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d at 638.

Persons receiving the subpoenas were instructed by the Attorney
General that a secrecy provision of the Act prohibited them from
speaking to anyone other than their attorney concerning the
proceedings.
the

(Id.)

Pursuant to information discovered during

investigation, criminal

Appellants in April of 1984.

charges were brought

against

Id.

The investigation continued in the same manner following the
filing of criminal charges. JA.

In May of 1984, officers and

Due to the secret nature of the investigation, very little
information on the investigation itself is contained in the court
file; therefore, many of the facts surrounding the conduct of the
investigation are drawn from the Court's opinion in In re Criminal Investigation.

employees of Utah Power & Light filed a Motion to Quash Subpoenas
issued in aid of the criminal investigation.

Utah Power & Light

argued that the Subpoena Powers Act was unconstitutional on its
face and as applied.

In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d at

639.
Judge Bunnell ruled on their motions May 30, 1984, holding
the Act constitutional provided that the prosecutors (i) inform
subpoenaed

witnesses

investigation,
the matter

whether

they

were

targets

of

the

(ii) inform targets of the nature and scope of

under

investigation,

and

(iii) conduct

the

investigation within the parameters of the good cause affidavit.
Id.
In August, Emery Mining moved to quash an investigative
subpoena sent by the Attorney General as part of the ongoing
investigation.

Judge Bunnell granted the Motion to Quash and

various motions to reconsider his earlier ruling on the constitutionality of the statute.

Id.

On reconsideration, Judge Bunnell

held that the act was vague and violated the rights of due
process and the right against self-incrimination.
Pages 3 through 7)

(Appendix,

In terminating authority for the inves-

tigation, the Court cited the following as examples of the abuses
which had occurred.

Subpoenas sent to an accounting firm

demanded "all books, records and papers of any kind relating to
Mike Thompson and Associates . . . Mike Thompson, individually,
Bruce Conklin, individually, . . . and all other individuals

and/or entities associated therewith.ff

Judge Bunnell also cited

as abuse the fact that the deposition of Brent Fletcher, who was
named as a co-defendant along with Thompson and Conklin, was
taken in violation of the safeguards imposed by the Court.
(Appendix, Page 5)
Following Judge Bunnell's ruling, Appellants brought a
motion before Judge Billings, the trial judge, to suppress the
evidence obtained in violation of their constitutional rights in
the criminal investigation.
1984.

That matter was heard December 27,

(Supplemental Record pages 1-29)

On January 10, 1985,

Judge Billings, by Memorandum Decision, denied Appellants' Motion
and ruled that:

(1) Judge Bunnell's ruling that the statute was

unconstitutional constituted the "law of the case," (2) that the
proper standard for determining whether the evidence must be
suppressed was Utah Code Annotated

§ 77-35-12(g)j and (3)

Defendants failed to carry their burden of proving both a) that
the State's conduct resulted in a substantial violation of their
constitutional rights, and b) that the acts of the State were not
committed in good faith reliance on what it assumed was a
constitutional statute.

(Appendix, Pages 8-14)

The case proceeded to trial in July of 1985. (R.686)
Appellants were convicted. (R. 448-460)

Appeal was taken and

briefs filed with the Utah Supreme Court; however, in transferring cases to the newly created Court of Appeals, this case

was sent down to the lower court.

The trial judge, Judge

Billings, was by then a judge on the Court of Appeals.
In December of 1987, the Utah Supreme Court, in State v.
Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987), held that Utah Code Annotated
§ 77-35-12(g) impermissibly shifted the burden of proving a substantial violation of constitutional rights and lack of good
faith on the part of the police officers to the Defendants and
was therefore unconstitutional.

This ruling invalidated both the

statute and the reasoning upon which Judge Billings based her
ruling in this case.
The Court of Appeals, recognizing that the basis for Judge
Billing's ruling had been invalidated by Mendoza, substituted the
federal "Good Faith" exemption to the exclusionary rule created
in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).

Applying a

recently created extension to that doctrine which was enunciated
in Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 107 S. Ct. 1160, 94 L.Ed. 2d,
364 (1987), the Court of Appeals stated:
This Court may affirm a trial court's
decision to admit evidence on any proper
ground, even though the trial court assigned
another reason for its ruling. Regardless of
the decision of the Utah Supreme Court on the
constitutionality of the Utah Mini-Grand Jury
Act, we hold the evidence obtained pursuant
to the subpoenas duces tecum was admissible
under the principles set forth in Krull. The
trial court's denial of defendants' motion to
suppress is affirmed.
State v. Thompson, 751 P.2d 805, 810 (Utah App. 1988) (citations
omitted).

Just three weeks after the Court of Appeals issued its
opinion in the instant case, this Court released its opinion in
In re Criminal Investigation, wherein this Court agreed that the
Subpoena Powers Act had been applied in an unconstitutional
manner in this case, but upheld the constitutionality of the
Subpoena Powers Act by construing it to contain limitations in
addition to those initially imposed by Judge Bunnell.

In re

Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d at 636.
Appellants1 Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

The

Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the evidence
obtained through the unconstitutional investigation should have
been suppressed at trial.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The grounds and reasoning supporting the Trial Court's
admission of the evidence gathered in the investigation have been
soundly rejected by this Court.

The Court of Appeals' basis for

affirming the trial court's ruling is not applicable to our fact
situation, since there was no "good faith reliance" on the
statute and since the purpose of the exclusionary rule will be
served by exclusion of the evidence in this case.

Article I,

Section 26 of the Utah Constitution prohibits application of the
reasoning relied on by the Court of Appeals to violations of
state constitutional law.

The reasoning of the federal case

relied on by the Court of Appeals should be rejected to preserve
the independence and integrity of State constitutional rights.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED IN
VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S RIGHTS
The evidenced gathered by the Attorney General under the
Subpoena Powers Act violated Appellants1 rights to be free of
unreasonable searches as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution and Article I Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution; their rights under the Fifth Amendment and Article
I § 12 of the Utah Constitution to avoid self incrimination and
their rights of due process and equal protection, as guaranteed
by the 14th Amendment and by Article I § 24 of the Utah
Constitution,
A.

Search and Seizure,

In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the Court
first stated the principle that evidence seized in violation of
Defendants1 Fourth Amendment rights is inadmissible.

That case,

decided prior to the adoption of the Utah Constitution in 1896,
invalidated a statute which authorized the court, upon motion by
the prosecutor, to require the Defendant to produce in court his
private books, invoices and papers.

The statute in question

allowed the prosecutor to make an allegation and then, if "in his
belief any business, books, invoices or papers belonging to or
under the control of, the defendant or claimant, will tend to

prove any allegation made . . . may, at its discretion, issue
notice to the defendant or claimant to

produce such books,

invoices, or papers in Court, . . ." Boyd, 116 U.S. at 620.

The

Supreme Court, after an eloquent recitation of the historical
antecedents of the Fourth Amendment, stated:

"any compulsory

discovery by extorting the parties oath, or compelling the
production of his private books and papers, to convict him of a
crime, or to forfeit his property, is contrary to the principles
of a free government.11

Boyd, 116 U.S. at 631-32.

The Court held that the statute violated both Fourth and
Fifth Amendment rights stating
these two Amendments throw great light on
each other. For the "unreasonable searches
and seizures11 condemned in the Fourth Amendment are almost always made for the purpose
of compelling a man in a criminal case to be
a witness against himself".
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633.
In the instant case, the Attorney General issued subpoenas for
the "books, papers, records", of Appellants.

These were issued

to Appellants1 bankers, accountants and business associates,
compelling production of the documents by order of the court.
Failure to comply was punishable by contempt.

This Court, in In

re Criminal Investigation, held that these actions "denied rights
guaranteed by the act and by the Fourth Amendment. U.S.
Constitution Amendment IV."

754 P.2d at 659.

These actions also denied Appellants

the protections

guaranteed by Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.

Since that provision must provide at least as much protection as
the Fourth Amendment, a Fourth Amendment Violation is by
necessity a violation of Article I, Section 14; therefore no
additional analysis regarding the scope of the protection offered
under the State Constitution is necessary when a federal
violation has been established.
Wasatch Metal, 594

See Industrial Commin. v.

P.2d 894 (Utah 1979).

In In re Criminal Investigation, this Court held that
without the warnings and notice requirements inherent in the act
that the opportunity for pre-compliance challenge of the subpoenas was stifled and that such warnings were necessary to protect
Defendants' rights.

It is undisputed that such warnings were not

given in the instant case.

The failure to give these warnings

violated Appellants1 rights.
The Court construed the secrecy provision of the Subpoena
Powers Act to require disclosure of the good cause affidavit.
re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d at 656.

In

Also, the Court

concluded that all investigations must be fully documented and
that such documentation be maintained by the district court
authorizing the investigation.

In re Criminal Investigation, 754

P.2d at 653. Without this documentation the district court would
have no way to adequately supervise the investigation.

Without

access to the good cause Affidavit, individuals receiving
subpoenas would have no way to determine whether the information
sought came within the scope of the affidavit. See, In re

Criminal Investigation, 754 at 654.

In the instant case, this

Court found that the secrecy provisions of the Act were applied
too broadly.

This flaw, and the failure to fully document the

investigation, prejudiced Appellants by preventing any meaningful
pre-compliance challenge of the subpoenas until the investigation
was nearly complete.

When the subpoenas were challenged, the

challenges were upheld.

Had the warnings and notices been given

in this case as the Court has required, Defendants could have
challenged the issuance of the subpoenas at a time when the
challenge would have afforded adequate protection of their
rights.
The manner in which the investigation was carried out in the
instant case violated Defendants1

rights under the Fourth

Amendment and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
Therefore, all evidence seized as a result of the investigation
must be suppressed.

Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914);

State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987).

B.

Self-incrimination.

As noted by the Court in Boyd, the rights guaranteed by the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments are often very closely related.

In

analyzing the constitutionality of the Subpoena Powers Act, this
Court held that

in order to protect the rights against

self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, and more
particularly by Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution,

that

ff

the state's attorney must notify every witness prior to

interrogation (i) of the general subject matter of the investigation, (ii) of the existence and nature of the privilege
against self-incrimination, (iii) that the information provided
may be used against the witness in a subsequent criminal proceeding, and (iv) of the right to have counsel present.
Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d at 648.

In re

Only the final warning

regarding the right to counsel was afforded the witnesses in the
instant case.

Had these warnings been given as is now required,

the witnesses may have refused to answer certain questions or
may, under the protection of Article I Section 12, may have been
able to exercise their right to remain silent.

See, In re

Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d at 660, (Stewart, Justice,
dissenting.)
Article I, Section 12 imposes another requirement that
special warnings be given to the targets of the investigations to
apprise them of their rights.

The target warnings required by

the Act were not given in this case.

The deposition of Brent

Fletcher was taken without informing him that he was a target of
the investigation.

(Appendix, P.5).

The targets of the

investigation were never apprised of their status or given an
opportunity to assert the rights guaranteed by Article I, Section
12.
Without the Constitutional safeguards required by this
Court, the Subpoena Powers Act violates the self-incrimination

provisions of both the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution.
Since the evidence gathered as a result of the investigation in
the instant case was done so in violation of these rights, the
information thus gathered is inadmissible and Appellants1 motion
to suppress should have been granted.
C.

Due Process.

The unique circumstances of this case have had the effect of
denying Appellants due process of law guaranteed under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
Article I Section 7 of the Utah Constitution.

The investigation

was

which

authorized

by

the

7th

District

responsibility for its supervision.

Court

bore

Under that authority Judge

Bunnell terminated the investigation because of violations of
constitutional rights of the subjects of this investigation
(Appendix, Page 6). However, since the criminal actions spawned
by the investigation were filed in Third District Court, Judge
Bunnell lacked jurisdiction to rule on the admissibility of the
evidence gathered.
This reveals one problem with the Subpoena Powers Act not
addressed by the Court in In re Criminal Investigation.

The

considerable power of the court to supervise the investigation,
and thus insure the protection of individual rights, is ineffective if, as here, the supervising court does not have power to

rule on the admissibility of evidence.

This problem was serious-

ly compounded in the instant case by the failure to make an
adequate record of the investigation.

The minimum requirements

for documentation outlined in In re Criminal Investigation, 754
P.2d at 653, were not met in this case.

Appellants were forced

to argue this case before a judge who was unfamiliar with the
details of the investigation and they were improperly saddled
with the burden of proving both a "substantial violation" of
fundamental rights and "lack of good faith" on the part of the
investigating officer.
1987).

See State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah

Furthermore, they were forced to carry this burden on the

basis of a record which was constitutionally inadequate and which
had been improperly withheld from them.
The procedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights contain
limitations on the exercise of the government's power over its
citizens which are so fundamental to a fair and ordered system of
justice that the absence of one or another of these particular
guarantees denies a suspect or a defendant due process of law.
See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
In conducting the investigation in violation of the safeguards imposed by Judge Bunnell, and without the procedures
imposed on the Subpoena Powers Act by this Court, the State
committed wholesale violations of fundamental rights in gathering
the evidence used against Appellants in this case.

The notion of

"due process of law" contained in the 5th and 14th Amendments and
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution requires more than
an after-the-fact acknowledgement that additional safeguards
should be required.

"When state action impinges on fundamental

rights, due process requires standards which clearly define the
scope of permissible conduct so as to avoid unwarranted intrusion
on those rights."

In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1981).

This

Court has acknowledged that the investigation conducted impinged
on fundamental rights.

The application of the Subpoena Powers

Act to Appellants was a denial of due process, if not because the
standards were unclear, because the standards simply were not
applied.
The fact that the Act can, if certain guidelines are followed, be applied in a constitutional manner does not change the
fact that the Act, as applied in the instant case did not adequately protect the rights of the witnesses or the targets of the
investigation.

By conducting the investigation in a manner which

impeded judicial supervision and was inconsistent with fundamental constitutional principals, the state denied Appellants1
rights to due process of law as guaranteed by the State and
Federal Constitutions.
D.

Equal Protection/Uniform Operation of Laws.

As demonstrated both by Respondents in In re Criminal
Investigation, and by Appellants in this case, the Subpoena
Powers Act was applied unconstitutionaly in this instance.

Due

to the procedural requirements imposed by this Court, the
Subpoena Powers Act can no longer lawfully be applied in the same
manner as it was applied in the instant case.
The Utah Constitution Article I, Section 24 provides "all
laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.11

Although

this provision may differ in both language and scope from the
Federal provision, it embodies the same general principle as the
14th Amendment.

Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City

Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 888-89 (Utah 1988).

That principle, simply

stated is that the law cannot be applied one way to one person
and another way to someone similarly situated.
Any person who is targeted for an investigation conducted
under the Subpoena Powers Act must be afforded the safeguards
imposed by the Court.

To require less would violate the rights

of the subjects of the investigations.

Appellants are guaranteed

by the Constitution uniform operation of the law.

They seek only

to be afforded protection equal to that which the Constitution
requires be given any subject of an investigation under the Act.
If the Subpoena Powers Act requires full documentation of

the investigation, or adequate warnings to persons subpoenaed, or
notice to targets of the investigation in order to be applied in
a constitutional manner, then Appellants need be afforded these
rights.

The

failure

to

offer

Appellants

the

required

constitutional safeguards denies the protection afforded every
other citizen who comes under the jurisdiction of the Subpoena
Powers Act.
Court's

Allowing evidence gathered in violation of the

construction

of

the Act

is prohibited

by

the

constitutional guarantees of equal protection and "uniform
operation" of law.
II.
THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
TAINTED ALL OF THE EVIDENCE.
Appellants assert that all of the evidence sought to be
suppressed was gathered in direct violation of their rights under
the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and Article I, Sections 7, 12, 14, 24, 25, 26, and
27 of the Utah Constitution.

However, any evidence gathered

during the course of the investigation which was not a direct
result of violations of Appellants1 constitutional rights was the
direct result of violations of the constitutional rights of each
person subpoenaed.
633.

See In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d

All information gathered in the investigation is therefore

tainted and must be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree11.
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
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(1963); U.S. v.

Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 275 (1978);

Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.

United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48
Utah 1981).
In Wong Sun, the police burst into a Chinese laundry looking
for drugs.

The initial search was not based on probable cause

and uncovered no evidence.

However, the subject of the search,

intimidated by the police conduct, gave information which allowed
the investigation to broaden and eventually resulted in the
seizure of a small amount of heroin and an arrest and conviction.
Even though the illegal search in Wong Sun did not directly
violate the rights of the defendant, evidence seized because of
information gathered in the illegal search was suppressed as
being "fruits of the poisonous tree.11
The facts of this case are analagous.

The investigation was

conducted in a fashion that violated the Constitutional rights of
the persons receiving the subpoenas.

See In re Criminal

Investigations, 754 P. 2d 633. Each person subpoenaed and each
document uncovered by the subpoenas added a piece to the puzzle
in the prosecution's very complicated case and also added a link
to the paper chain of evidence that was presented to the jury.
The policy underlying the rule against the use of evidence
obtained by unconstitutional means cannot be circumvented simply
because the illegal search uncovered evidence indirectly instead
of directly.

See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).

Without the evidence obtained in violation of the rights of each
person answering a subpoena issued under the special investigation, the prosecution would not have been able to put together the long, complex scenario of allegations which form the basis
of the charges against Appellants.

Therefore, all evidence,

whether gathered in direct violation of Appellants1 rights, or
the rights of others, or whether indirectly resulting from
information so gathered, is tainted by the unconstitutional acts
and therefore must be excluded as "fruits of the poisonous tree.11
See Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 120 (1942); see
State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 52 (Utah 1982); State v. Northrup, 756
P.2d 1288, 1295 (Utah App. 1988).
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING TAINTED EVIDENCE.
Judge Billings1 ruling admitting the evidence was based on
the statutory good faith exception contained in Utah Code Ann. §
77-35-12(g).

This Court, in State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah

1987), held that statute unconstitutional.

One of the fatal

flaws in § 77-35-12(g) was that it shifted the burden to the
defendant to "prove the equivalent of police conduct made in bad
faith before the Court can apply the exclusionary rule."
186.

Iji. at

Another basis for striking down the statute was that it

required a threshold requirement of a "substantial violation11 of
Defendant's rights that went beyond what was required by United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).

This, the flawed portion of the statute, formed the basis of
the trial court's reasoning in admitting the evidence.
the State argued:

At trial,

"Now, if Defendants are to succeed in this

motion it is their burden to show the lack of good faith and to
show substantial violations of constitutional rights. . .If
(Supplemental Record, Pages 25 and 26).

In denying the Motion to

Suppress, the trial court stated:
[D]efendantsf Motion to Suppress is denied as
they have not shown: (1) that the State1 s
conduct in its use of the !fSubpoena Powers
Act" in the case resulted in a substantial
violation of Defendants1 constitutional
rights, and (2) that the acts of the State
were not committed in good faith reliance on
what it assumed was a constitutional criminal
statute.
Appendix page 13•
Clearly, the trial court placed the burden of proof on the
Defendants.

In State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d at 186, this Court

states:
Pursuant to Mapp, if the defendant establishes a fourth amendment violation, the
illegally-seized evidence must be suppressed
regardless of the egregiousness of, or the
intentions motivating, the police officers'
conduct. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655, 81 S. Ct. at
1891. Because Leon is an exception to the
application of the exclusionary rule, the
State must prove the necessary elements of
the "good faith" exception.
Nowhere in the transcript of the suppression hearing is there any
evidence which would support a finding that the State carried its
burden of showing "good faith" reliance.

The trial court impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to
the Appellants and held them to a standard whose threshold was
higher than that allowed under the Federal Constitution.

Under

the proper standard of review the state is required to prove the
application of the good faith exception.

Since both the grounds

and the reasoning supporting the trial court's decision have been
struck down by this Court, its ruling denying Appellants1 Motion
to Suppress should be reversed.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING
The Court of Appeals, recognizing that the basis for the
trial court's ruling was no longer sound, stated it could uphold
the trial court's decision to admit evidence if there were a
proper basis to do so.
(Utah App. 1988).

State v. Thompson, 751 P.2d 805, 810

The Court of Appeals' basis for admissibility

was the principle set forth in Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340,
(1987).

In that case, a police officer conducted a warrantless

administrative inspection of an auto salvage yard pursuant to
statutory authority.

The day following the search, the statute

was held unconstitutional.

The trial

court

granted

the

Defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized in the search.
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting the argument that
the officer had relied on the statute in good faith See People v.
Krull, 107 111 2d 107, 481 N.E.2d 703, 708 (1985).

The United

States Supreme Court reversed and said that since the officer's

actions were authorized by statute that no deterrent effect would
be served by exclusion of the evidence.
U.S.

Illinois v. Krull, 480

, 96 L.Ed. 2d 375. (Hereinafter cited as Krull).
The Court of Appeals' reliance on Krull is misplaced.

First, Krull's reasoning is not applicable to our factual
situation, second, even if Krull is applied, there was no "good
faith reliance" on the

statute, third,

Krull's result is

impermissible under the Utah Constitution, and finally, the
rationale of Krull should not be applied to violations of
Appellants' state constitutional rights.

These arguments will be

addressed separately.
A.

The Exclusionary Rule Exception Found in Illinois v.
Krull is Not applicable to our Factual Situation.

Krull relies on Leon's characterization of the purpose of
the exclusionary rule as being simply to deter misconduct on the
part of the state.

The majority reasons that "unless a statute

is clearly unconstitutional, an officer cannot be expected to
question the judgment of the legislature that passed the law,"
therefore suppressing the evidence seized by a officer acting in
objective reliance on a statute would have little deterrent
effect.

Krull, 480 U.S.

, 94 L.Ed. 2d at 375.

Unlike Krull, application of the exclusionary rule in this
case will have a deterrent effect.

In upholding the constitu-

tionality of the Subpoena Powers Act, this Court imposed guidelines designed to protect constitutional rights, however, as the

Court recognized, the Act still vests considerable discretion in
the investigating authority and may still be subject to abuse.
Application of the exclusionary rule in this case is necessary
and will have a deterrent effect in future cases.

Unless there

is a penalty imposed on the abuse of the considerable powers
granted under the Act, there is nothing to restrain the investigating authority from pressing the limits imposed by this Court
beyond constitutional boundaries.
Where the statute is declared unconstitutional as in Krull,
no further reliance can be made on it and there is no danger of
the same type of violations reoccurring.

However, under the

unique facts of the instant case, the statute remains in force;
thus the risk of future violations of the same type or nature
remain.

Discretion still lies with the investigating authority;

therefore, some deterrent for the abuse of that discretion must
remain to ensure that individual liberties are adequately protected.

The rationale of Krull, that no deterrent effect would

be served by exclusion of the evidence, is simply not applicable
to the facts before the Court.
B.

There was no "Good Faith Reliance11 on the Language of
the Statute.

Krull, in paraphrasing Leon's rational for admitting illegally obtained evidence states:
Penalizing the officer for the [legislature's] error, rather than his own, cannot
logically contribute to the deterrence of
Fourth Amendment violations.

Krull, 94 L.Ed 2d at 375 (citations omitted).
Here, the error cannot be laid at the legislature's feet.
Had the legislature erred in drafting the statute, so that an
objective reading of the Subpoena Powers Act allowed acts in
violation of constitutional principles, the Act, by definition,
would be facially unconstitutional.
Law, p. 600 (1983).

See Nowak, Constitutional

This Court, in In re Criminal Investigation,

held the Subpoena Powers Act to be constitutional on its face.
754 P.2d at 658.

Therefore, any error in the application of the

statute is the error of the person responsible for interpreting
and enforcing the act; in this instance, the Attorney General.
The situation is analagous to a police officer making a stop
for "probable cause.11

The officer has authority to stop someone

provided he has "probable cause" to do so.

What constitutes

probable cause is difficult to determine, yet, an officer may
have to make that decision several times a day without time for
deliberation or research into the latest court opinion.

If the

officer is wrong in his subjective judgment regarding probable
cause, the evidence seized as a result of the stop and any
subsequent search must be suppressed. See State v. Mendoza, 748
P.2d 181, (Utah 1987).
Here, the Attorney General was authorized to "conduct a
criminal investigation."

Although the Subpoena Powers Act may

not have been as precise and complete as it could have been in

outlining how this was to be done, it contained much more
specific guidelines than are available to an officer making a
decision to stop for "probable cause."

Like the officer, the

Attorney General must be familiar with prior court rulings on
search and seizure.

He must be aware that "all witnesses must be

able to claim the privilege against self-incrimination." See
State v. Ruggeri, 19 Utah 2d 216, 222-23, 429 P.2d 969, 973
(1967); see also In re Criminal Investigation, 754 at 646.

He

must be aware that some type of warning is required to make the
exercise of that privilege meaningful.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384

U.S. 444, 469 (1966); see also In re Criminal Investigation, 754
Po2d at 22.

He must know that adequate records of the

investigation

be kept

supervision.

to

allow

for meaningful

judicial

See In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d at 653.

In short, the Attorney General, in applying not only the Subpoena
Powers Act, but any statute he is empowered to enforce, must know
the constitutional limitations imposed on the statute by rulings
of the Court, and by the language of the constitution.
The Attorney General's task in that respect is no more
difficult than that of the rookie patrol officer who must make a
determination of probable cause.

However, the Attorney General's

education, training and experience give him a greater knowledge
of the law.

He has tremendous resources at his disposal, includ-

ing up-to-the-minute access to the latest court opinions on any
subject.

He is not forced to make his decision on how the

investigation is to be conducted at the spur of the moment or
with his life at peril.

Appellants ask merely that the Attorney

General in this case be held to the same standard as any police
officer.

In making a subjective judgment on whether his actions

meet constitutional requirements, there should be no difference
between the officer's judgment regarding probable cause and the
Attorney General's interpretation of a facially valid statute.
When the Attorney General is wrong in determing when his actions
infringe on the constitutional rights of a citizen he should not
be allowed to avoid the suppression of the evidence wrongly
seized as a result of his misjudgment.
In this case, due to the validity of the statute, not only
was there no reliance on the statutory language as in Krull, but
the violations of the specific restrictions approved by Judge
Bunnell obliterated any claim that such reliance could have been
made in "good faith."
investigation

was

Judge Bunnell, concerned with the way the

proceeding,

outlined

certain

specific

constitutional requirements and stated that he would give the Act
the presumption of constitutionality so long as it was conducted
within

that

framework.

On reconsideration

Judge Bunnell

observed:
Since that ruling, the court has had opportunity to see the manner in which the act has
been applied and is being applied and the way
it can be used to violate the personal rights
of the citizens of this state. . . . the act
has been abused and is subject to continued
abuse. . . .

Appendix at Page 6.
As untenable as any claim of "good faith reliance11 may have
been prior to the issuance of the guidelines by the district
court, any vestige of such reliance was obliterated once Judge
Bunnell gave specific direction as to how the investigation was
to be conducted.

From that point, no violation of Appellants1

rights could have been made-in "good faith."
The Court of Appeals relied on Krull without any analysis of
the facts of this case.

After outlining the principle stated by

Krull the Court of Appeals simply stated: "Likewise, in the
instant case, subpoenas duces tecum were executed in objective
reasonable reliance on prior, external authorization." State v.
Thompson, 751 A.2d at 809-10.
A police officer acting on a valid warrant has "prior
external authorization," but only to act within constitutional
bounds.

Even with a valid warrant he cannot violate the suspects

Fourth Amendment rights by exceeding the limits of the warrant,
Kremen v. U.S. , 353 U.S* 346 (1957); or his Fifth Amendment
rights, or right to counsel;

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335

(1963); nor can he deny the suspects due process of law.

All

government action, whether by prior authorization of statute or
judicial authority must be conducted within the bounds set by the
Constitution.

The fact that the Subpoena Powers Act allowed the

issuance of subpoenas in aid of the criminal investigation did

not nor cannot authorize the manner in which the investigation
was conducted.
"Objectively reasonable reliance11 does not follow automatically from the fact that there was "prior external authorization. ff
statute.

In this case there was no objective reliance on the
The statute as written called for subjective interpre-

tation in application of constitutional principles external to
the statutory language.

Reliance solely on the statutory lan-

guage removed from overriding constitutional principles could not
be made in good faith especially after specific constitutional
guidelines were set by Judge Bunnell.
violated by the State in this case.
violated as a result.

These guidelines were
Appellants1 rights were

The remedy provided for such constitution-

al violations is suppression of the evidence seized.
v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288.

See State

Both the trial court and the Court

of Appeals erred by failing to afford Appellants this remedy.
C.

The Exclusionary Rule Exception found in Illinois v.
Krull Cannot Apply to State Constitutional Violations.

The Court of Appeals1 reliance on Krull is misplaced. Krull
does not, and cannot, apply to violations of the Utah Constitution.
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution was intended
to prevent state-authorized intrusion into private citizens1
papers, records, personal privacy and dignity.
of I., R.L., 739 P.2d 1123 (Utah App. 1987).

See In Interest

The framers of the

Utah Constitution included the provisions of Article I, Section
26 to ensure that rights guaranteed by our State Constitution
could not be infringed by any governmental action.
Section 26 of the Utah Constitution states:

Article 1,

"Provisions of this

Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express
words they are declared to be otherwise."

The Utah Constitution,

Article I, Section 14 states that "the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated."

The

language of Article I, Section 14 is clear and unambiguous.
Article 1, Section 26 prohibits giving any effect to a statute
passed in violation of Constitutional provisions.

The result of

Illinois v. Krull is to give effect to a statute in derogation of
rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
prohibits this result.

Article I, Section 26

In Walton v. State Road Commin, 558 P.2d

609 (Utah 1976), Justice Maughn, in dissent, expressed this view
regarding the effect of Article I, Section 26 on the rights
guaranteed by Article I, Section 22, (prohibiting the taking of
private property without just compensation).

He stated:

This provision is mandatory and prohibitory,
and I do not believe the legislature can
attach to it a limitation which in effect
repeals it.
Id. at 611.
Similar views regarding the effect of Article I, Section 26
have been expressed in Romney v. Barlow, 24 Utah 2d. 226, 469

P.2d 497 (1972)(Callister, dissenting); Mattheson v. Monson, 588
P.2d 147, 153 (Utah 1975)(Hall, dissenting); Hume v. Small Claims
Court of Murray City, 590 P.2d

309 (Utah 1979) (Ellett,

dissenting).
The mandatory and prohibitory language of Article 1, Section
26 prevents the legislature from abrogating, limiting or modifying rights guaranteed by the State Constitution.

It embodies the

principle argued by James Otis in Paxton, Quincy 51 (Mass. 1761),
that "an act against the Constitution is void.'1
Adams, 523-528 (C. Adams, ed. 1850).
simply be ignored.

2 Works of John

Article I Section 26 cannot

As stated by Chief Justice John Marshall in

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1 Cranch 1803), "It cannot
be presumed that any clause in the Constitution is intended to be
without effect . . .."
The Court of Appeals1 ruling, based on the holding of Krull
must be reversed.

Article I, Section 26 mandates that the pro-

tections granted by the Utah Constitution cannot be abrogated,
even on a temporary basis, by a legislative enactment.
D.

The Court of Appeals Failed to Recognize State Constitutional Violations as an Independent Basis for Exclusion.

Irrespective of the prohibition of Article I, Section 26,
this Court should decline to apply the rationale of Krull to violations of Appellant's rights under the State Constitution.

It

is well-established that state courts can expand the protection
offered by their state constitutions beyond the scope of the

Federal Constitution.

See State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah

1981); Valley Bank & Trust v. Rite Way Concrete, 742 P.2d 105
(Utah App. 1987).
The instant case is illustrative of the necessity of doing
so.

The reasons for not applying Krull to violations of Article

I, Section 14 are best articulated by the four dissenting
Justices in Krull.

In Justice 0fConnor's persuasive dissenting

opinion, she condemns the holding of the majority for providing a
grace period for legislation during which the state is permitted
to "violate Constitutional requirements with impunity.ff
L.Ed.

2d at 382,

Justice O'Connor

Krull 94

states that Statutes

authorizing unreasonable searches were a central concern of the
framers of the Fourth Amendment.

Iji. at 383.

The Fourth

Amendment is the embodiment of the idea that no legislative act
can authorize an unreasonable search.

The fact that legislators

fail, on occasion, to adhere to the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment is evidenced by the many statutes held unconstitutional
on fourth amendment grounds.

See Krull, supra, See eg. , Ybarra

v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979); Sybron v. New York, 392 U.S.40
(1968); State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987).

The fact

that legislators are subject to polital pressures to "get tough11
on law breakers gives motivation to invade rather than protect
Fourth

Amendment rights.

The exception provided by the Krull

majority adds the further temptation to promulgate questionable
laws under which convictions could be obtained by using tainted

In dealing with the Utah Constitution search and seizure
provision, Article I, Section 14, the arguments voiced by Justice
O'Connor are persuasive because they return to the constitutional
language and the purpose it was designed to serve.

In developing

Krull, the Federal Court relied on an extention to a principle
stated in an exception to a remedy designed to protect against
the violation of the constitutional provision.

When the princi-

ple becomes this attenuated from the source, it loses its validity.

Article I, Section 27 of the Utah Constitution desires to

prevent such occurrences.

It states:

"Frequent recurrence to

fundamental principles is essential to the security of individual
rights and the perpetuity of free government.ff

By returning to

the source of the rights granted and the purposes for granting
them, rather than allowing the right to be obscured by the body
of law that has grown up around it, results such as Krull cannot
be reached.
In Krull, the legislature passed an unconstitutional statue;
it was applied to an individual who challenged it; it was
conceded that the application of the statute violated his rights,
yet he is provided no remedy. Article I, Section 14 should not
yield such an anomalous result.

The purpose behind Section 14 is

to protect the privacy of the individual against intrusion by the
state through prohibiting the passage of laws which invade
individual rights.

Where individual rights are violated, the

individual who prevails in showing that a statute, or the
application thereof, violated his rights should be vindicated.
The result reached in Krull has the effect of not only
encouraging legislatures to violate constitutional rights with
impunity, it has the more insidious vice of preventing such laws
from being reviewed by the courts.

A person who feels his rights

have been violated has no motivation under Krull to go through
the time, expense and bother of an appeal since even if he is
successful in showing the unconstitutionality of the Statute, he
himself is afforded no remedy.

This impedes the Court's role in

protecting constitutional rights.
This Court should not allow individual liberties to be
compromised in this fashion.

By declining to follow Krull in

extending the exception to the exclusionary rule for violations
of State Constitutional rights, this Court ensures that the right
of the people of this state "to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated."

Utah Constitution, Article I,

Section 14.
CONCLUSION
Suppression of the evidence, as requested in Appellants1
pretrial motion is mandated by the facts and circumstances of
this particular case.

Appellants were the targets of an investi-

gation which, by admission of the State, was carried out in an
unconstitutional manner.

The trial court admitted evidence based

on an unconstitutional statute.

The Court of Appeals neverthe-

less affirmed the trial court on a principle of federal law which
is not applicable to violations of our State Constitution and
which has no application to the facts of this case.

For all of

these reasons, Appellants respectfully request that the trial
court's ruling denying their motion to suppress be reversed.
Respectfully submitted this

day of December, 1988.
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Attorneys for State of Utah
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF EMERY COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF A

:

SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

:

CS NO. 1

THE STATE OF UTAH TO:
Norman Maxfield
1407 West North Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116
You are hereby commanded to set aside all business
and excuses and appear at the Office of the Attorney General
of the State of Utah, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City,
Utah, at the hour of £*?&> Km.. on QJIA

_l2#LT*day of ftpfcP -

f

1984, to give testimony

in support of a criminal investigation.
be represented by legal counsel.

, the

You are entitled to

You are also commanded to bring with you any and
all books, records, documents, accounts, or papers
pertaining to Mike Thompson, Mike Ziemski, Bruce Conklin, et
al., MT\>Vanguard, Great Basin Patrol, and L. Brent
Fletcher.
This subpoena duces tecum is authorized by order
of the District Court.

Disobedience to this order is

punishable by contempt of Court.
Given under my hand this

day of April, 1984.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
PAUL M. WARNER
Assistant Attorney General
Chief, Litigation Division

STANLEY \H. OLSEN
Assis£fcxlt Attorney General
Attorney for State of Utah

HLfcU
ft THE SEVENTH JUOICIAI DISTRICT C0(£
OF UTAH \H AND FOR EMERY CO.

SEP 2 ! 1934
BRUCE C. FUNK.
By.

J(.

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR EMERY COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF
A CRIMINAL

INVESTIGATION

MEMORANDUM DECISION
RELATIVE TO
CONSTITUTIONALITY
CS NO. 1

On September 12, 1984, a hearing was held in this
Court pursuant to Notice on Motions submitted by parties
who were subject to subpoena under this Criminal Investigation proceeding.

The Court ruled from the bench on most

Motions and took under advisement the challenge to the
constitutionality of the Act (77-22-1 et s e q . ) , authorizing
the investigative procedure being used as raised by several
of the parties for the first time in their own behalf and by
other parties on a Motion to reconsider.
The Court previously considered the constitutional
challenge to the Act at a hearing held on May 30, 1984, and
the Court ruled at that time that the Court would give the
Act the presumption of constitutionality provided that in
its application the State Prosecutors comply with the following requirements:
1. Witnesses subpoenaed pursuant to the
Act must be informed whether or not they are
targets of the investigation;
Recorded in Judgment Record

Jhw

2. Such witnesses must be informed of
the nature of the matter under investigation
and the scope of the investigation;
3. Investigations conducted under the
authority of the Act must be limited to
criminal investigations within the parameters
of the initial good cause affidavit.
Since that ruling, the Court has had opportunity
to see the manner in which the Act has been applied and is
being applied and the way it can be used to violate the
personal rights of the citizens of this state.
For instance, the subpoena duces tecum served upon
Emery Mining Company commands that Company to produce:
"records which identify all officers,
directors, consultants and employees
(both union and non-union, professional
and mining) of Emery Mining for the period
1979 to the present. Such shall include,
but not be limited to, names, addresses ,
telephone numbers, dates of employment
and employee numbers, if known* M
Upon challenge, this Court ordered that general
subpoena suppressed as being too broad in any
of any criminal

investigation

activity.

A previous subpoena issued by the Attorney
Office attempted to get into Utah Power and Light

General's

Company's

dealings in uranium mining, when in fact the # original

Good

Cause Affidavit mentioned no indication of any criminal dealings in this area.

The State withdrew this subpoena when

challenged in this court.
-2-

Another subpoena issued out of this proceeding
was directed to a CPA firm and ordered the production of
the following:
"You are commanded to bring with you any and all
books, records, papers of any kind relating to
Mike Thompson and Associates, Guardex, Alarmex,
Vanguard, Mike Thompson, individually; Mike Ziemski,
individually; Bruce Conklin, individually; Patsy
Bowman, individually; and all other individuals
and/or entities associated therewith/ 1
This subpoena was withdrawn by the State upon challenge in
this Court.
The deposition of L. Brent Fletcher,taken

pursuant

to subpoena issued under this investigative proceeding, did
not comply with the requisites that this Court feels must be
imposed to make the Act constituional in its application in
that the witness never was informed that he was a target,
nor as to the nature of the investigation and, because of
the Secrecy Order, he had no way of knowing whether the matter
being inquired into was within the perimeter of the good cause
showing.

He was allowed, and did have, his attorney present

with him during these proceedings.
Some criminal charges have already been filed in Salt
Lake County based upon information obtained through this proceed
ing, and a civil anti-trust case has been filed in Salt Lake
County, also as a result of some of the information derived from
this investigative proceeding.

This investigative proceeding is
-3-

still open and being used for whatever purposes the State
desires and solely within their discretion under the Act,
without limitation as to when a criminal investigation
becomes a prosecution or controlling the ultimate use of
the findings for civil purposes.
The Act has been abused and is subject to continued
abuse under its broad terms and provisions that set no limitations upon the State or any guidelines to the use of their
subpoena power.

The Court quite agrees with the Utah Supreme

Court in its statement given in the case of In Re The Matter of
Nelda Boyer, 636 P2d 1085, wherein the Court states as follows:
"When State action impinges on fundamental rights,
oue process requires standards which clearly
define the scope of permissable conduct so as
to avoid unwarranted intrusion on those rights."
This Court has, therefore, concluded that the Act
is too vague and does not give proper protection to individual
citizens against violation of their constituional right of
due process and protection against self-incrimination and
allows for an absolute abuse of power without the benefit of
judicial review or control once the general subpoena power
is granted and finds the Act is u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
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THEREFORE, the Court does hereby dismiss this
Criminal Investigative Proceeding and strikes the Investigative
Subpoena Power heretofore granted to the State by this Court.
DATED this ^ , / X ^ d a y of September, 1984.

JJZ.
,—^OYD
BUNNELL/DISTRICT COURT/'
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. CR-84-1115

vs.
L. BRENT FLETCHER, MICHAEL C.
THOMPSON, BRUCE A. CONKLIN,
and MICHAEL ZIEMSKI,
Defendants.

The defendants' Motion to Suppress was heard by the Court
on the 27th day of December, 1984. The State of Utah was represented
by Stanley Olsen, David Schwendiman and Suzanne Dallimore, Assistant
Attorney Generals, and the defendants by Harold Christensen,
Esq., Max Wheeler, Esq., and Sumner J. Hatch, Esq.

The Court

heard oral arguments of counsel after having reviewed the extensive
Memoranda filed.

At this hearing the Court ruled that Judge

Bunnell's ruling that the "Subpoena Powers Act,"

Utah Code

Ann., Section 77-22-1, was unconstitutional was the law of this
case.

However, the Court took under advisement the issue as

to whether the evidence gathered by the State pursuant to the
Subpoena Powers Act should be suppressed as a matter of law.
Defendant claims that the evidence obtained by the State
through the use of the "Subpoena Powers Act,"

Utah Code Ann.,

Section 77-22-1, et seq., must be suppresssed.

While defendants

^*y2.

,oO^-
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acknowledge that no Utah authority exists for this position,
they cite United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U.S. 298
(1978), and United States v. Genser, 595 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1979)
(Genser II) , as supportive of suppression.

These cases are

not on point.
In LaSalle National Bank an Internal Revenue Service agent
asked the United States District Court to enforce a summons
issued to the bank under 26 U.S.C. 7602.

The district (trial)

court ruled the summons unenforceable because the agent was
conducting a criminal investigation and Section 7602 is a civil
summons power

(unlike the Subpoena powers Act in the present

case which specifically authorizes criminal investigations) .
The Supreme Court did not address the issue of suppression,
but instead referred the case to the District Court to determine
if the summons had been issued to gather evidence for both a
civil and a criminal prosecution or if it had been issued solely
to gather evidence for a criminal prosecution.
Defendants also cite Genser II as authority for the position
that evidence gathered pursuant to the "Subpoena Powers Act"
must be suppressed.

In Genser II, the Internal Revenue Service

had issued summonses under Section 7602. Defendants were convicted
of tax evasion and appealed on the grounds that the summonses
issued during the investigation exceeded the I.R.S.'s authority.
The appellate court remanded the case to the district court
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for an evidentiary hearing on the defendants' contention that
the I.R.S. had exceeded itfs authority.

On remand, the district

court concluded that the summonses employed during the investigation
were not issued solely for a criminal purpose as defined in
LaSalle National Bank.

The defendants challenged that ruling

on the grounds that the district court had misconstrued the
substantive requirements of LaSalle National Bank.

The appellate

court again remanded the case to the district court on the basis
that the proper focus under LaSalle National Bank should have
been on the purpose of the individual summonses not on the purpose
of the investigation as a whole as the district court had concluded.
The appellate court stated that:
If any one of those summonses were issued
solely for a criminal purpose, the fruits
of that summons would have to be suppressed,
even in the face of an overwhelmingly civil
purpose of the investigation as a whole.

!£. at 150
While the court in Genser II cites no authority for the
conclusion that the evidence must be suppressed and gives no
standards for when suppression is mandated, these issues were
addressed at length in United States v. Genser, 582 F.2d 292
(3d Cir. 1978)

(Genser I) .

In Genser I, the court indicated

that, under LaSalle National Bank, in order for a summons to
be validly issued it must first be issued before the Service
recommends to the Department of Justice that a criminal prosecution
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be undertaken and second, the Service at all times must use
the summons authority in good faith pursuit of the congressionally
authorized purposes of Section 7602 —

not in an attempt to

garner evidence in furtherance of a solely criminal investigation.
The party opposing the summons bears the burden of disproving
the existence of a valid civil tax determination or collection
purpose on the part of the I.R.S. The Genser I court also indicated
that the purpose of making the suppression remedy available
to taxpayers was to ensure governmental compliance with the
requirements of Section 7602.

Thus, the holding in Genser II

is limited to those cases where a governmental agency has: (1)
acted in bad faith, and (2) abused a statutory right, and where
(3) suppression would ensure compliance with the statutory provision
in the future.
Assuming, as defendants contend, that the present case
is governed by the same standards as violations of Section 7602,
there has been no showing in this case that the State acted
in bad faith, or that suppression of the evidence would ensure
governmental compliance in the future.

Thus, the defendants

have failed to meet their burden of proof with respect to whether
the evidence obtained under the Subpoena Powers Act ought to
be suppressed even under the standard advanced by them. Furthermore,
it is questionable whether the Section 7602 standards should
be applied in the present case since in Genser I the court clearly

APPENDIX 11

PAGE FIVE

STATE V. FLETCHER

indicated

MEMORANDUM DECISION

that these standards were specifically created to

deal with a- particular type of governmental violation of the
Internal Revenue Code.
The appropriate standard for suppression of the evidence
acquired under the "Subpoena Powers Act" in this case requires
that the defendants show, as the State contends, a "substantial
violation" of the defendants" constitutional rights and that
the violation was "not committed

in good faith," as required

by Rule 12(g), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (Section 77-35-12(g)).

Defendants have neither acknowledged

this Rule, nor

attempted to meet the required showing for suppression of evidence.
The United States Supreme Court in Segura v. United States,
82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984); United States v. Leon, 82 L.Ed.2d 677
(1984); and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 82 L.Ed.2d (1984), discusses
the history and reasoning behind the Fourth Amendment and its
vital protections and recognizes that suppression is not automatically and blindly imposed each time there is an irregularity
in the manner in which evidence is gathered.

A ruling that

the use of the "Subpoena Powers Act" in this case was unconstitutional does not automatically mandate suppression of the evidence
obtained thereunder.

Defendants must also establish a substantial

violation of their constitutional rights, as well as evidence
that the actions taken by the prosecution were not taken in
good faith reliance upon the validity of the statute.
APPENDIX 12
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The Court is particularly persuaded by the following language
in Leon, supra;
* * *

We have not required suppression of the
fruits of a search incident to an arrest
made in good faith reliance on a substantive
criminal statute that subsequently is declared
unconstitutional. Michigan v. DeFillippo,
443 U.S. 31, 61 L.Ed.2d 343, 99 S.Ct. 2627
(1979) . . .
Leon, supra, makes reference to Michigan v. DeFillippo,
433 U.S. 31, 61 L.Ed.2d 343, 99 S.Ct. 2627 (1979), where the
court held that a finding that a criminal statute is unconstitutional
does not require suppression of the fruits of an arrest made
in good faith reliance on the statute.
These cases stand for the principle that suppression of
evidence is not automatic.

The DeFillippo case demonstrates

that a search made in good faith reliance on a statute subsequently
declared unconstitutional does not require suppression.
Based upon the foregoing reasoning, the defendants1 Motion
to Suppress is denied as they have not shown: (1) that the State's
conduct in its use of the "Subpoena powers Act" in this case
resulted in a substantial violation of the defendants1 constitutional
rights, and

(2) that the acts of the State were not committed

in good faith reliance on what it assumed was a constitutional
criminal statute.
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If the defendants believe the facts conform to the above-cited
standard, then the matter should be set for an evidentiary hearing
in order that defendants may attempt to meet their burden.
Dated this

15th

day of January, 1985.

&LJ2L

INGS
J^XETH M. BILLINGS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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